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Theories of hypnotic responding can be assigned to two classes based on their reliance on 
metacognition. While several theories assume that responses to hypnotic suggestions can be 
implemented without executive intentions, the metacognitive class of theories postulate that 
the behaviors produced by hypnotic suggestions are intended and the accompanying feeling 
of involuntariness is only a consequence of strategically not being aware of the intention, 
proposing that hypnotic responding is the product of a purely metacognitive process. In this 
project, we seek to disentangle these two classes of theories  in a behavioural experiment by 
testing a central prediction of the simplest metacognitive theory, namely the cold control 
theory. To this aim, we compared the performance of highly suggestible participants in 
reducing the Stroop interference effect in a post-hypnotic suggestion condition (word 
blindness: that words will appear as a meaningless foreign script) and in a volitional 
condition (asking the participants to imagine the words as a meaningless foreign script) to 
explore whether the simplest version of the cold control theory, could account for hypnotic 
phenomena. The results of the pilot experiment revealed that the Stroop interference effect 
was smaller in the post-hypnotic suggestion condition than in the volition condition calling 
into question the core idea of the cold control theory as these data suggest that there is more 
to hypnotic response than a simple change in monitoring of higher order thoughts of 
intentions. Consequently, the cold control theory may need to be revised to fit the idea that an 
unconscious intention can be more effective than a conscious one, which indicates that 
possessing a higher order thought of a mental state can have a causal role on one`s first order 
abilities. Given the importance of the issue, we believe a pre-registered experiment is 
imperative to draw strong conclusions as it would provide us with more credible evidence. 
 





The cornerstone of hypnotic responding is the feeling of involuntariness that 
accompanies an otherwise goal-directed behaviour (Weitzenhoffer, 1974, 1980; Terhune, 
Cleeremans, Raz & Lynn, 2017). Responses to hypnotic suggestions vary widely in terms of 
their difficulty. Some motor actions can be done by almost everyone (e.g., feeling a magnetic 
power between the palms that is pulling them towards each other), whereas the imaginative 
exercise to produce vivid hallucinations of noises can only be performed by a minority of the 
population (usually highly suggestible people, henceforth highs). The question of how these 
alterations in cognition can be implemented with a disrupted sense of agency has been the 
focus of scientific endeavour for decades.  Theories from the sociocognitive tradition of 
hypnosis stress the role of demand characteristics in forming the subjective experiences 
involved with hypnotic responding and often highlight the strategic nature of the action as 
appropriate to the specific context (Comey & Kirsch, 1999; Spanos, 1986). The cognitive 
approach also often underscores the active role of the participants in creating an altered sense 
of reality (e.g., Kihlstrom, 1998) and several theories of this tradition, the dissociation 
theories (Bowers, 1990; Hilgard, 1977, 1991; Kihlstrom, 1985), propose that the sense of 
involuntariness can emerge by dampening the monitoring of one's own control processes. 
Recently, a theoretical attempt has been made to synthesize these views by depicting a 
metacognitive account of hypnosis, namely the cold control theory (Barnier, Dienes & 
Mitchell, 2008; Dienes, 2012; Dienes & Perner, 2007), that draws from the higher-order 
thought theories (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2005) of consciousness. 
The (higher-order thought) HOT theory of consciousness postulates that a 
representation or a state is only conscious if one becomes aware of its content by the 
existence of a “higher-order thought” or state (HOT) that refers to it (Rosenthal, 2005). A 
higher order mental state is a mental state not just about the world (which is first order) but 
about a mental state. For instance, imagine having a first-order state about the world (e.g., 
“there is a tree”).  According to HOT theories, one has no conscious experience of the world 
unless one possesses in addition a second-order thought about that first-order state (e.g., “I 
see that there is a tree”). HOTs are not restricted to perception, thus they can refer to any 
mental state, including those with control functions.  
Cold control theory stresses that the mechanism by which hypnotic responding 
(behavior accompanied by the feeling of involuntariness) emerges is a process that allows 
people to replace the HOTs about their intentions with inaccurate ones (Dienes, 2012). For 
instance, to create the experience of the hallucination of a noise (e.g., the buzz of a 
mosquito), one has to have an intention about imagining that particular noise (e.g an,intention 
with the content “imagine a buzzing mosquito”), while forming an inaccurate HOT about the 
intention (e.g. with the content, “I`m not intending to imagine a buzzing mosquito”). The 
theory also claims that the intention to produce the appropriate response is formed by the 
actor and it is implemented by regular cognitive control processes implying that the 
behaviour will be in accord with the goals of the actor and that a hypnotic response cannot be 
more efficient than a non-hypnotic one (if a simple first-order intention is logically sufficient 
to produce the response). In a nutshell, cold control theory posits that hypnosis is solely a 
metacognitive phenomenon, and, in the simplest version of cold control, the theory assumes 
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that hypnosis is targeting specifically the HOT of intending thereby leaves the first-order 
states untouched.1 The latter assumption coincides with the idea that HOTs, or in other 
words, being conscious of mental states, have only limited or zero function in terms of 
influencing first-order states (Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2008)2. In addition, this 
assumption also implies that the theory deems hypnotic responding as a form of unconscious 
control as it claims that responses to suggestions are intended (implemented by executive 
control processes) while the intention to act is unconscious by virtue of possessing an 
inaccurate HOT that the intention does not exist. 
The notion that hypnotic responses are produced by a strategically relinquished 
metacognition of one's intentions has gained some support. For instance, individual 
differences in metacognition, particularly the tendency to generate inaccurate HOTs of 
intending, are moderately associated with hypnotisability (Dienes, 2012). Further, 
experimental evidence suggests that the temporary disruption of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), which has a vital role in the functioning of metacognition (Lau & 
Passingham, 2006; Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham & Lau, 2010), with rTMS ( 
Coltheart et al, in press; Dienes & Hutton, 2013) or alcohol (Semmens-Wheeler, Dienes & 
Duka, 2013) facilitates hypnotic responding3. Another line of research also corroborates the 
idea that hypnotic responding is the product of a purely metacognitive process by revealing 
that behaviors created by hypnotic suggestions are not related to  first-order abilities of 
cognitive functioning (apart from metacognition). For example, several studies have 
presented evidence that performance on tasks involving first-order abilities of executive 
functioning such as inhibition (Dienes et al., 2009) or sustained attention (Jamieson & 
Sheehan, 2002) do not predict hypnotisability. Moreover, evidence counts against the claim 
that responses to hypnotic suggestion can enhance first-order abilities compared to responses 
that are non-hypnotic. For instance, there is no evidence for the superiority of hypnotic 
suggestions in recollection (Erdelyi, 1994; Nogrady, McConkey, & Perry, 1985), (more 
controversially) analgesia (Milling, Kirsch, Meunier & Levine, 2002; Spanos, 1986; for a 
counter-argument: e.g. Derbyshire, Whalley & Oakley, 2009; Hilgard, 1977; Miller & 
Bowers, 1993) and endurance (Barber, 1966, Levitt & Brady, 1964).  However, an 
experimental finding, the word blindness effect (Raz, Shapiro, Fan & Posner, 2002; the term 
was first used by Parris, Dienes & Hodgson, 2012), calls into question the key statement of 
                                                 
1 Cold control theory assumes that hypnotic response involves strategic changes in HOTs about solely 
intentions. This claim is independent of whether or not there is domain specificity in metacognitive abilities (e.g. 
Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos & Blackmon, 2014), or whether hypnotisability involves alterations in metacognition 
over other domains as well, such as perception. 
2
 Of note, a special case of HOT theories, the cross-order integration theory (COI; Kriegel, 2007), stresses that 
first-order states and HOTs can causally influence each other by binding together to a unified conscious 
representation, which can, for instance, enhance cognitive functioning. 
3
 It is to be noted that none of the experimental manipulations were exclusive in a sense that they might 
impaired cognitive functions aside from metacognition (Dienes, 2012), allowing for theories focusing on the 
role of disrupted executive functioning (Woody & Sadler, 2008) to account for the data. Moreover, a recent 
replication failure of the Rounis et al. (2010) study suggests that the stimulation of the DLPFC with rTMS might 
not impair visual awareness (Bor, Schwartzman, Barrett & Seth, 2017); the meaning of these findings is a matter 




the theory, as it suggests that highs can acquire abilities through hypnosis that they do not 
possess when responding non-hypnotically. 
The word blindness phenomenon can be induced by suggesting to highs that they will 
see words as meaningless characters, or as words of a foreign language, while they are 
engaged in a color naming Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). Generally, the suggestion is applied 
post-hypnotically, which means that it is provided during a hypnotic induction prior to the 
Stroop task and only later activated by a clue (e.g., a clap). It has been shown by various 
independent laboratories that when this suggestion is given to highs, they can lower the 
interference and the Stroop effects (as measured by the difference in response times (RTs) 
between the incongruent and neutral, and the incongruent and congruent trials, respectively) 
compared to their own performance in a non-hypnotic condition (Augustinova & Ferrand, 
2012; Parris et al., 2012; Raz et al., 2002; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006). 
Moreover, low suggestible people cannot reproduce this improvement in performance 
(Casiglia et al., 2010; Raz & Campbell, 2011; Raz et al., 2002, 2003) further underlining the 
notion that hypnosis and so the ability to respond hypnotically can have a causal influence on 
first-order states. It has been proposed that the word-blindness suggestion allows people to 
gain control over otherwise automatic processes (i.e., reading), specifically, by being able to 
dampen the processing of input words (Raz et al., 2002; Raz et al., 2006;  Raz, Fan & Posner, 
2005).  
Overall, these findings cast doubt on the idea that a response by becoming hypnotic 
only impacts HOTs of intending and cannot alter first order abilities, but the findings do not 
refute the cold control theory per se. First, the cold control theory postulates that to produce 
the word blindness effect, one has to have a first-order intention to create the experience of 
the script as being meaningless by using a strategy at the disposal of the person without 
having an accurate HOT about intending to do so. Consequently, cold control theory asserts 
that the mere comparison of a suggestion and a no suggestion (Stroop task under normal 
circumstances) condition overlooks the fact that people have been (implicitly) instructed to 
create an experience of meaninglessness  in the former case but they were told not do so in 
the latter one (Dienes, 2012). Therefore, this contrast cannot inform us whether the power of 
imagination (i.e., creating a counterfactual model of reality in which meaning cannot be 
extracted from the script) depends on the form of the accompanying HOT. Second, individual 
differences between highs and lows in the ability to create word blindness can account for the 
disparity in their performance, and indeed, it has been found that highs and not lows can 
produce the word blindness effect as a response to suggestions in the absence of a hypnotic 
induction (Parris & Dienes, 2013). This latter finding may seem to settle the matter in favour 
of cold control: subjects have no more first-order abilities responding hypnotically as non-
hypnotically. However, this conclusion depends on hypnotic responding being entirely 
conditional on a previous hypnotic induction. If a subject can, without an induction, respond 
hypnotically, then the mere presence or absence of a hypnotic induction is irrelevant to theory 
testing. Indeed, it has been shown that highs can for example produce hallucinations in 
response to suggestion, or dramatically relieve pain, without a previous hypnotic induction 
(e.g., Kirsch et al., 2008; Milling et al., 2002). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the 
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induction procedure might be irrelevant to the production of the feeling of involuntariness, 
which is the core feature of a hypnotic response; for example, highs reported comparable 
levels of involuntariness after a suggestion to experience a sex change with and without a 
prior induction (McConkey, Szeps & Barnier, 2001). Thus, the use of an induction or not is 
not relevant to testing the prediction of cold control theory. What is relevant is requesting 
subjects to have the same first-order intentions while having an accurate or inaccurate HOT 
about the intention. That is, a clear test of the key prediction of cold control theory 
necessitates the contrast of the control of highs experienced as voluntary with the control of 
highs experienced as involuntary (henceforth voluntary and involuntary control) in the 
capacity of reducing the Stroop interference effect while asked to achieve this by having  the 
same first-order intention. By this, we could investigate whether hypnosis is purely a 
metacognitive phenomenon. Cold control theory defines hypnotic responding as nothing 
more nor less than acting intentionally while having the inaccurate HOT that one is not 
intending to perform that action. This is perhaps one of the simplest theories of hypnosis one 
could have: the essence of a response being hypnotic lies only in a type of metacognitive 
monitoring. Thus, critically testing the theory is important: Is a more complex theory needed 
or not? 
One might argue that former research has already tested the core claim of cold control 
theory in studies investigating the efficiency of imagination compared to hypnotic responding 
to suggestions and that the theory has been disconfirmed. For instance, there is evidence that 
the fusiform activation of highs is bilateral when they are responding to a hypnotic suggestion 
to hallucinate colours whereas only the right fusiform shows activation when they are 
requested to imagine a grey-scale pattern in color, indicating that voluntary imagination 
might not produce the same visual experience as hypnotic responding (Alpert & Spiegel, 
2000, Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando). In addition, it has been shown that highs 
produce stronger pain experience of heat when responding to a hypnotic suggestion 
contrasted with a request to imagine the same type of pain (Derbyshire, Whalley, Stenger & 
Oakley, 2004). However, in both of these studies other factors than a mere change in 
monitoring of the HOT of intending might have been in play to produce varying experiential 
and neuropsychological responses. For example, if the wording is not carefully phrased in the 
non-hypnotic and hypnotic conditions than it can create demand characteristics resulting in a 
“hold back” effect (Spanos, 1986; Zamansky, Scharf & Brightbill, 1964) or stronger 
expectations in the hypnotic condition (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999), as the participants aim to 
please the experimenter or they do not believe that their non-hypnotic response can be as 
effective as the hypnotic one. We argue that none of these studies provide an unequivocal test 
of the prediction of cold control theory as the expectations of the subjects were not measured 
in any of them. The wording of the conditions in Kosslyn et al.`s (2000) experiment were not 
designed to convince the participants that they can and should try to create comparable 
responses in the different conditions. Further, and crucially, it was not demonstrated in these 
examples that the imagination condition involved greater feelings of voluntariness than the 
hypnotic condition; thus cold control may have been the mechanism in both conditions. 
Therefore, a genuine test of the prediction of cold control theory need to possess a volitional 
request that can create equal level of expectations about the efficiency of non-hypnotic and 
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hypnotic responses ensuring that the participants expect to perform the same with and 
without the HOT of intending. 
To address this issue, we constructed a fully within-subjects design experiment in 
which the performance of involuntary and voluntary control can be directly compared. We 
employed three experimental conditions using highly suggestible subjects. In the 
posthypnotic suggestion condition (henceforth simply “suggestion” condition), we used the 
word-blindness posthypnotic suggestion to see the words as meaningless characters during 
the Stroop task. In the volition condition, we told the participants to reproduce the effect of 
the word blindness suggestion by responding to our volitional request to imagine the words as 
meaningless characters while doing the Stroop task. In the no suggestion condition, we asked 
the participants to undertake the Stroop task with the instruction of not imagining the words 
as meaningless so that we can measure their baseline performance. In this scenario, the cold 
control theory predicts that people can overcome the Stroop interference to the same extent in 
the suggestion and volition conditions when compared to the no suggestion condition. 
Therefore, if the results show a stronger reduction of the interference effect in the suggestion 
compared to the volition condition then one has to conclude that there is more to hypnosis 
then the strategic relinquishment of metacognitive monitoring in the form of accurate HOTs 
of intending. The experiment is testing a core prediction of the simplest version of cold 
control theory and so if it is disconfirmed, we need to revise the theory to fit the data.  The 
key assumption of cold control theory is that the difference between hypnotic versus non-
hypnotic responding is just the difference between having and not having a HOT; if this 
assumption is retained, the finding of a greater Stroop reduction in the suggestion rather than 
volition condition would imply that the HOT of an intention can have a causal influence on 
first order states by hindering cognitive control processes (a rare finding of conscious 
executive processing being less effective than unconscious, contrast Cleeremans, 2006). 
A key relevant outcome neutral test is that subjects experienced the word blindness 
effect as more volitional in the volition condition than in the suggestion condition. This 
would be the evidence that there was a difference in the presence of relevant HOTs of 
intending. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first that measured the subjects’ 
conscious experience of control over ‘word meaninglessness’ to unravel whether such an 
experience feels like something that has been intentionally imagined or merely perceived. 
Investigating the phenomenological level of the participants’ cognition can inform us whether 
their behaviour felt involuntary when the suggestion was active compared to the volitional 
control. Moreover, controlling the potentially confounding role of expectations is imperative 
(Braffman & Kirsch, 1999), so we implemented a self-report measure to gauge the 
participants` expectations about seeing the words as meaningless characters. If subjects 
reported different levels of expectation for producing a word blindness effect in the 
suggestion than in the volition condition, expectations alone may explain differences in 
Stroop reduction in the two conditions (Magalhães De Saldanha da Gama et al, 2013). In 
addition, we took the participants` subjective experiences of `word meaningfulness` to 
explore the extent to which voluntary and involuntary control can alter the conscious 
experiences of the world. The measures reflect the extent to which subjects subjectively 
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responded to the suggestions and to the volitional request; they could therefore constitute the 
crucial test of whether suggestions and volitional requests are equally effective. However, as 
the apparent problem for cold control lies with the objective measure of Stroop reduction, it is 
the RT measures that form the crucial test. Finally, we measured the `depth` of hypnosis to 
shed more light on the nature of the experienced state that accompanies the implementation 
of both types of control. This is an exploration, a sideline from the main point of the 
experiment, testing the assumption that the experience as of being in a hypnotic state, as 
interpreted by the participants, does not accompany post-hypnotic suggestion (e.g., Terhune, 
Luke & Cohen Kadosh, 2017). 
First, we report a pilot experiment using this procedure. While the results yielded 
moderate evidence against cold control theory, the procedure and analyses were not pre-
registered. Further, there was not a strict stopping rule (albeit Bayesian analyses were used). 
Thus, the pilot study will serve as a basis for a proper pre-registered test of cold control 
theory. 
Pilot Experiment  
Methods 
Participants.  Thirty-three highly suggestible students of the University of Sussex, all 
proficient readers of English, attended the experiment in exchange for course credits or 
payment. Eleven participants were recruited in 2013 and twenty-two students were recruited 
in 2014.  The students had been screened in group sessions for being highly suggestible prior 
to the study. Students scoring 9 or higher on the Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility, Form C (WSGC; Bowers, 1993) were recruited to the study. The participants 
granted their informed consent before participation and the Ethical Committee of the 
University of Sussex has approved the study. 
Stimuli and apparatus.  The stimuli of the experiment closely followed those used 
by Raz et al. (2002). The stimuli consisted of 4 types of color words (RED, BLUE, GREEN, 
and YELLOW) and 4 types of neutral words (LOT, SHIP, KNIFE, and FLOWER). The 
stimuli set of the congruent condition included the color words presented in colours matching 
the meaning of the words (e.g., RED in the color red). The incongruent items were color 
words displayed in colours mismatching the meaning of the word (e.g., RED in the color 
blue). The neutral words were length-matched to the color words and so all items had their 
corresponding presentation color (e.g., LOT presented always in red). All words were written 
in upper-case font and presented against a white background. The vertical visual angle of the 
stimuli was 0.5º, while the horizontal visual angle of the stimuli lied between 1.3º and 1.9º 
depending on the length of the word. The distance between the participants` eyes and the 
computer screen was approximately 65cm. The response keys used in the experiment were 
“V”, “B”, “N”, “M” for the colours red, blue, green and yellow, respectively. The keyboard 
buttons were not colour-labelled. The experiment was produced in and run by the software 
Experiment Builder (SR Research Ltd, Ottawa, ON, Canada). 
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Design and procedure.  The study had a 3x3 within subjects design with the 
independent variables of the congruency type of the trial (congruent vs. neutral vs. 
incongruent) and the experimental condition (no suggestion, suggestion, volition). The 
proportion of congruent, neutral and incongruent trials was equal (33%) in each condition and 
the presentation of color and neutral words was frequency and length matched. The 
conditions were counterbalanced across participants and the Stroop trials (144 per condition) 
were displayed in a random order within each condition. 
The experiment took place in a small room with the experimenter present and only 
one participant at a time. After providing their informed consent to the study, the participants 
engaged in a practice Stroop task for 5 minutes. The participants were asked to lay their left 
middle finger on “V”, left index finger on “B”, right index finger on “N” and right middle 
finger on “M” while undertaking the Stroop task. The participants were told to focus on the 
middle of the screen during the Stroop task, where a black fixation cross appeared for 
1500ms at the beginning of each trial. The fixation cross was replaced by one of the Stroop 
stimuli and remained on the screen until response. Finally, a feedback (“CORRECT” or 
“INCORRECT”) flashed in black on the screen and then a new trial started with the fixation 
cross. The response to stimulus interval was 2000ms. This sequence remained constant 
among the experimental conditions. 
Next, a hypnotic induction4 with the post-hypnotic suggestion to see the words as 
meaningless characters (Raz et al., 2002) was delivered by the experimenter and the 
participants were told that a clap would activate and a double clap would deactivate this 
suggestion. To test the effectiveness of the suggestion, the experimenter activated it by the 
clap and asked the participant to rate the meaningfulness of a presented coloured word on the 
following scale: 1 - completely clear, 2 - little unclear, 3 - unclear, 4 - completely unclear. 
Those who reported to see the word completely clear or little unclear received an additional 
instruction: “Notice how as you look at the word on the screen, you can look at it with the 
meaning fading to the background of your mind. We have found even when people 
consciously experience some meaning after this suggestion, they still process the words 
differently at a deeper level. You know you are capable of not reading meaning fully, 
remember how you have zoned out while reading a book.”. Finally, the suggestion has been 
deactivated, and the participants have been brought back to wakefulness by a deinduction. 
For the exact wording of the protocol, see Appendix A.  
 Subsequently, the participants undertook the three experimental conditions in a 
random order. In the no suggestion condition, the participants were told to respond as fast and 
as accurately as they could, and they were asked not to make any attempt to see the words as 
gibberish or words of a foreign language. The suggestion condition started with a clap 
accompanied by a sentence highlighting that the suggestion had been activated. At the end of 
the condition, the suggestion was deactivated by the double clap. In the volition condition, 
the participants were requested to voluntarily reduce the Stroop interference:  
                                                 
4 Although, according to the cold control theory, the usage of the induction procedure is not necessary to 
produce a hypnotic response to a suggestion, we included the induction in the protocol to make sure that the 
responses of the subjects can unambiguously be considered as hypnotic.  
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“Highly hypnotisable individuals such as you have been shown to be able to eliminate the 
interference from the irrelevant word when under the influence of the post-hypnotic 
suggestion and even when the suggestion is given without hypnosis.  We would like you to 
voluntarily strongly and clearly imagine the irrelevant words as gibberish, words of a foreign 
language so that no meaning can be taken from them.  This is not a hypnotic suggestion and 
we have not hypnotised you for this part of the task. You'll notice we have not initiated a 
suggestion by clapping or giving any other cue. You have the ability to do that anytime you 
please, under your control, as effectively as you just did. Please now voluntarily remove 
meaning from the words. You can do this so that it is under your control, just by exercising 
your imagination. You can be aware it is your imagination at the same time as it produces 
powerful effects.” 
 Throughout the experiment, we administered several self-report measures, and in each 
case, the experimenter read out loud the question and provided the answer options on a sheet 
for the participants. Before the start of the Stroop task in each condition, the participants 
reported their expectations on how certain they are that the words will be meaningless. When 
they finished the Stroop task, the following measures were taken: four items assessing the 
subjective experience of the meaningfulness of the words; a task to recall the words they have 
seen5; depth of hypnosis scale (Hilgard & Tart, 1966); an item gauging the experienced 
control over the meaningfulness of the words; a dichotomous question whether they 
perceived or imagined the words as meaningless6. For the exact questions and answer options 
see Appendix B. After finishing the last condition, the participants were thanked and 
debriefed.  
Data analysis  
Statistical analyses.  We conducted all of our analyses with the statistical software R 
3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016). Since we had a fully within subjects design, we calculated 
difference scores so that we were able to test directly all of our hypotheses with Bayesian 
paired t-tests (we only conducted direct contrasts; i.e. not an omnibus F or B comparing the 
three conditions as the omnibus statistic would not be informative in terms of our 
hypotheses). Along with frequentist statistics, we calculated the corresponding Bayes factor 
(B) which was used as the basis of decision making in respect of the compared hypotheses.  
Bayes factor. The Dienes and McLatchie (2018) calculator in the R environment was 
used to calculate the Bayes factors, which has a t-distribution as a likelihood function for the 
data, and we set the degrees of freedom of the theory to 10,000 in each analysis to have a 
likelihood function for the theory close to normal. The computation of the B requires the 
specification of the prediction of the two models that we intend to compare. We applied a 
half normal distribution with a mode of zero to model the predictions of the alternative 
hypotheses, as the tested hypotheses have directional predictions and assume that smaller 
effects are more probable than larger effects (Dienes, 2014). We report Bs in the following 
format: BH(0, X), in which H indicates that the model is half-normal, the first parameter (0) 
                                                 
5
 The data regarding this question have not been utilised for this project. 
6
 This question was omitted from the no suggestion condition 
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stands for the mode of the distribution and the second parameter (X) is the SD of the 
distribution. To specify the standard deviation of the alternative models, we applied the 
following strategies. Based on the meta-analysis of Parris, Dienes & Hodgson (2013) who 
have found that the word blindness suggestion generally halves the interference effect of the 
baseline (no suggestion) condition, we employed half of the interference effect observed in 
the no suggestion condition as the SD of all models testing the difference between the 
suggestion and volition and the no suggestion conditions. In order to test the traditional 
Stroop and interference effects, we used the average of the Stroop and interference effects 
found among studies containing the word blindness suggestion (See Table 1 of Parris et al., 
2013). Concerning the self report measures, we applied the rule of thumb of Dienes (2014) 
that suggests, in the absence of prior information, to halve the scale of measurement and use 
it as the SD of the one-sided model (if that matches scientific intuitions closely enough: In 
this case a population mean difference anywhere on the scales is not completely 
unreasonable).  
Although, B is a continuous measure of evidence by definition, we used the 
convention of 3 and 1/3 to distinguish between no evidence and good enough evidence for 
the alternative and null hypotheses, respectively (Jeffreys, 1961). Moreover, we use the label 
of moderate evidence for the values between 3-10 or 1/3-1/10, and the label of strong 
evidence for Bs greater than 10 or smaller than 1/10, in order to highlight the strength of the 
evidence (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). 
A Bayes factor is the strength of evidence for one model over another and thus 
depends on what the models are (Rouder, Morey, Verhage, Province & Wagenmakers, 2016; 
Rouder, Morey & Wagenmakers, 2016). We have endeavoured to keep the models simple 
and otherwise scientifically informed; nonetheless, the chosen parameters (e.g., the SD of a 
half-normal distribution) could be motivated in different ways. Therefore, to ascertain the 
robustness of our Bayesian conclusions to the SDs of the H1 models, we report a robustness 
region for each B, providing the range of SDs of the half-normal models that qualitatively 
support the same conclusion (using the threshold of 3 for moderate evidence for H1 and ⅓ for 
moderate evidence for H0) as the chosen SD7. The robustness regions are notated as: RR [x1, 
x2] where x1 is the smallest and x2 is the largest SD that gives the same conclusion.  
Bayesian parameter estimation with 95% Credibility intervals.  To explore the 
extent to which the post-hypnotic suggestion or the voluntary control reactivates a hypnotic 
trance, we applied parameter estimation rather than hypothesis testing. To conduct the 
estimation, we report the condition means of the depth of hypnosis with the 95% Credibility 
Intervals (CI). Note that the 95% CIs are numerically identical to the 95% Confidence 
Intervals as we employed uniform prior distributions.  
Results 
Data transformation.  The data of three participants were partially missing (one 
participant had only response time data whereas two participants had only self-reported data), 
                                                 
7
 Thanks to Balazs Aczel for this suggestion 
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and therefore they were excluded from the analyses. Trials with errors were omitted from the 
analysis of the response times (RTs) data (4.7% in total from which 1.4% from the no 
suggestion, 1.9% from the suggestion and 1.5% from the volition conditions)8. Moreover, 
using the outlier exclusion criterion of Raz et al. (2002), we deleted RTs that were 3 standard 
deviations either above or below the mean (1% of the correct trials from which 0.2% from the 
no suggestion, 0.3% from the suggestion and 0.4% from the volition conditions). In order to 
test the congruency related effects, we computed new variables. We calculated the extent of 
interference effect (RT incongruent – RT neutral) in the different suggestion conditions for 
each participant. The interference effect was specifically identified by Parris et al. (2013) as 
the Stroop component most reliably affected by the word blindness suggestion. 
Outcome neutral tests 1: Was there a Stroop effect and did the suggestion work?  
As expected, the RTs were the longest in the incongruent (M = 811, SD = 182) followed by 
the neutral trials (M = 766, SD = 177) and the fastest in the congruent trials (M = 729, SD = 
173). Comparing the conditions revealed support for the Stroop interference (t(29) = 6.34,  p 
< .001, Mdiff = 45 ms, dz = 1.16 , BH(0, 62) = 8.1*10
3, RR[3, 1.47*105]) and the Stroop effects 
(t(29) = 8.09,  p < .001, Mdiff = 82 ms, dz = 1.48, BH(0, 90) = 7.4*10
5, RR [5, 2.79*105]). Also 
importantly, we found moderately strong evidence for the classical word blindness effect 
(t(29) = 1.99, p = .056, Mdiff = 34 ms, dz = 0.36, BH(0, 30) = 3.99, RR [15, 63]), as the extent of 
the Stroop interference was reduced from the baseline of 60 ms to 26 ms in the suggestion 
condition.  
Outcome neutral tests 2: Did suggestion and volition conditions differ in 
experienced degree of control?  The analysis of the experienced level of control over the 
meaningfulness of the words indicated that the instruction to imagine the word as 
meaningless characters triggered a process experienced as more controlled than the 
suggestion (t(29) = 5.34,  p < .001, Mdiff = 0.9, dz = 0.98, BH(0, 1.5) = 5.4*10
3, RR [0.07, 
2.75*102]). Although, the participants tended to report that they perceived the script as 
meaningless in the suggestion condition (64% of the participants reported that they perceived 
rather than imagined the meaninglessness) and they rather imagined it in the volition 
condition (57% of the participants reported that they imagined and not perceived the 
meaninglessness), the results remained insensitive concerning whether the two procedures are 
different in nature (t(25) = 2.00,  p = .056, Mdiff = 0.23, dz = 0.39, BH(0, 0.5) = 2.78, RR [0.45, 
4.8]).9 
                                                 
8
 Note that we do not possess the raw data collected in 2013 anymore (only the RTs averaged across trials and 
within conditions and participants), therefore, these percentages have been based on the data collected from 22 
participants in 2014. 
9
 Note that the corresponding item of the questionnaire had only two levels (either imagination or perception), 
but we analysed the data as a continuous variable to make it comparable with the measure we will use in the pre-
registered experiment. The Supplementary Materials include an analysis of these data that considers this item as 
a dichotomous variable and aims to estimate the effect size. The results are in accordance with those in the main 
text, namely, the estimation revealed that the effect size lies within a broad range covering values larger as well 




Crucial test: Is the suggestion equally effective for suggestion and volition 
conditions?  Next, we tested the key prediction of the cold control theory by comparing the 
suggestion and volition conditions in terms of the RTs of interference effects, and the 
analysis yielded supporting evidence of a smaller interference effect in the suggestion 
condition (t(29) = 2.03, p = .052, Mdiff = 25 ms, dz = 0.37, BH(0, 30) = 4.00, RR[11, 50]). The 
participants managed to decrease the interference by 34 ms in the suggestion condition and 
only by 9 ms in the volition one compared to the no suggestion condition. However, the 
evidence regarding the difference between the volition and no suggestion conditions 
remained insensitive (t(29) = 0.51, p = .611, Mdiff = 9 ms, dz = 0.09, BH(0, 30) = .74, RR[0, 
81]). Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the RTs in the congruency conditions 
broken down by the experimental conditions. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the 
Interference scores in the three experimental conditions. 
 
Figure 1. Violin plot portraying the distribution of interference scores in the three 
experimental conditions. The black dots indicate individual data points; one dot represents 
the interference score of a single participant.  
The expectations to see the words as meaningless characters were raised in both of the 
suggestion (t(29) = 5.99,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.7, dz = 1.09,BH(0, 2.5) = 3.19*10
4, RR[0.11, 
5.42*102]) and the volition conditions (t(29) = 5.65,  p < .001, Mdiff = 1.58, dz = 1.03, BH(0, 2.5) 
= 1.27*104, RR[0.11, 4.93*102]) compared to the no suggestion condition. Yet, these 
increments were comparable (See Table 1) and there is evidence for no difference between 
the suggestion and volition conditions (t(29) = 0.38, p = .710, Mdiff = 0.12, dz = 0.07, BH(0, 2.5) 
= 0.18, RR[1.33, Inf]) implying that the the suggestion effect was enhanced  hypnotically 
versus volitionally beyond the impact of expectations (we have not regarded this as an 
outcome neutral test, in that if there had been an difference in expectancies we still could 
have conducted a version of the crucial test by partialling out expectancy effects). 
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Supporting test of interest: Do suggestions and volitional requests produce the 
same subjective response?  We investigated whether the manipulation of the 
meaninglessness of the words was successful on the subjective level of the participants, and 
whether the posthypnotic suggestion and volitional request produced similar subjective 
responses. The descriptive statistics about the subjective experience of meaninglessness are 
shown in Table 2 for each question and condition separately. Note that the first question was 
phrased reversed compared to the other three questions, thus, smaller values indicate stronger 
experience of meaninglessness in that case. The results of the phenomenological data on how 
the meaninglessness was sensed were only partly in line with the findings of the RTs. 
Statistically speaking, we found strong evidence favoring suggestion and volition over no-
suggestion in creating vivid experiences of meaninglessness. Although, the participants 
reported that they sensed more meaningless words in the suggestion than in the volition 
condition (in case of three measures from the four) the evidence regarding the advantage of 
the posthypnotic suggestion over volition remained insensitive in each case.  
Q1.  We found strong evidence for a difference between no-suggestion and each of 
the suggestion (t(29) = 5.78,  p < .001, Mdiff = 45, dz = 1.05, BH(0, 50) = 2.04*10
4, RR[3,  
1.42*104]) and volition conditions (t(29) = 4.29,  p < .001, Mdiff = 36.8, dz = 0.78, BH(0, 50) = 
4.15*102, RR[4, 9.45*103]). However, the evidence is insensitive in respect of the difference 
between these latter two conditions(t(29) = 1.56,  p = .13, Mdiff = 8.2, dz = 0.29, BH(0, 50) = 
0.65, RR[0, 99]). 
Q2.  The results revealed strong evidence in favour of the difference between no 
suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(29) = 4.69,  p < .001, Mdiff = 34.1, dz = 0.86, BH(0, 50) 
= 1.10*103, RR[3, 9.65*103]) and moderate evidence favouring  a difference between no 
suggestion and volition conditions: (t(29) = 2.64,  p = .013, Mdiff = 19.6, dz = 0.48, BH(0, 50) = 
6.90, RR[5, 1.23*102]). The data show insensitivity whether the suggestion and volition 
conditions differ (t(29) = 2.04,  p = .0502, Mdiff = 14.5, dz = 0.37, BH(0, 50) = 1.99, RR[31, 
3.14*102]). 
Q3.  The results indicate strong evidence favouring a difference between no 
suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(29) = 3.66,  p < .001, Mdiff = 24.5, dz = 0.67, BH(0, 50) 
= 71.47, RR[3, 1.35*103])  and between no suggestion and  volition conditions (t(29) = 3.32,  
p = .002, Mdiff = 28.7, dz = 0.61, BH(0, 50) = 36.9, RR[4, 7.33*10
2]). Moreover, we have strong 
evidence that the suggestion and volition do not differ (t(29) = -.59,  p = .557, Mdiff = -4.3, dz 
= -0.11, BH(0, 50) = 0.09, RR[14, Inf]). 
Q4.  Similarly to Q2, we found strong evidence for  a difference between the no 
suggestion and suggestion conditions (t(29) = 5.31,  p < .001, Mdiff = 34.4, dz = 0.97, BH(0, 50) 
= 5.51*103, RR[3, 1.05*104]), moderate evidence for a difference between no suggestion and 
the volition condition (t(28) = 2.60,  p = .015, Mdiff = 17, dz = 0.48, BH(0, 50) = 5.71, RR[4, 
100]) and insensitive evidence for the difference between suggestion and volition conditions 




Exploration: Do post-hypnotic suggestions produce a hypnotic trance at the time 
of activating the suggestion?  The suggestion might not be truly post-hypnotic as the 
participants reported being relaxed or even hypnotised (M = 1.37, 95% CI[1.06 – 1.67]) when 
the post hypnotic suggestion was triggered, indicating that a hypnotic state might have been 
experienced. Seemingly, voluntary control does not involve experiencing this hypnotic state, 
as the upper bound of the 95% CI (M = 0.8, 95% CI [0.52 - 1.08]) barely exceeded the level 
of being relaxed.  
Table 1 
Summary Table about the Means of the RTs and Self-report Measures in the three 
Experimental Conditions 
  Experimental condition 
Category Item (scale) No Suggestion Suggestion Volition 
Response 
times (RTs) 
Incongruent (ms) 853 (187) 775 (207) 805 (213) 
Neutral (ms) 793 (183) 749 (205) 755 (198) 
Congruent (ms) 748 (141) 712 (212) 726 (214) 
Expectations Expecting the words to be 
meaningless (0-5) 
0.59 (1.03) 2.29 (1.40) 2.17 (1.28) 
Experienced 
Control 
Control over meaningfullness 
(0-3) 
2.33 (0.84) 1.1 (0.69) 2 (0.71) 
Perception vs. Imagination (% 
of perception) 
- 64% (49) 43% (50) 
Depth of 
hypnosis 
Depth of hypnosis during the 
task (0-3) 
0.43 (0.5) 1.37 (0.81) 0.8 (0.76) 
Note. The Standard Deviations (SD) of the means are shown within the brackets.  
Table 2 
Summary Table of the four Items Measuring the Subjective Experience of Meaninglessness 
Item  Experimental condition 
No suggestion Suggestion Volition 
Q1: „Was the meaning of the words on the 




36.8% (28.5) 45% (35) 
 
Q2: „Were you aware of only an unclear 
meaning of the words on the screen” 
 




Q3: „Were you just aware of the color and 
had no idea of what script of the words were 
written in” 
20.9% (29.3) 45.3% (31.8) 49.6% (33.7) 
Q4: „Were the words on the screen written 
in a clear yet meaningless script” 
12.6% (23.1) 47% (30.5) 30% (31) 




In this experiment we aimed to discover whether highly suggestible people can 
produce the word-blindness effect outside of hypnotic context by voluntarily imagining the 
words as meaningless. The results provided moderate to strong evidence supporting the 
successfulness of the experimental manipulations in outcome neutral tests. Most importantly, 
the classical word-blindness effect was replicated and the volitionally induced 
meaninglessness was experienced as voluntary compared to its post-hypnotic counterpart. 
Although, the second measure assessing the nature of control was not sensitive, the amount of 
evidence was close to the convention of 3 (B = 2.78), suggesting that the process of 
meaninglessness was experienced as imagined in the volitional condition and as perceived in 
the suggestion condition. This difference between the two measures of control might be due 
to the fact that the latter item was only dichotomous and so not sensitive enough to capture 
the mild difference in how people sensed the meaninglessness. Therefore, a continuous item 
assessing the nature of control would be more appropriate. In sum the outcome neutral tests 
were satisfied and we can proceed with the crucial test. 
The main results revealed that volitionally induced control by imagining the words as 
meaningless characters did not enhance performance on the Stroop task to the same extent as 
the post-hypnotic suggestion. The evidence remained insensitive regarding the efficiency of 
voluntary control. Theories of hypnosis that regard the unique hypnotic nature of a response 
is constituted simply by a change in a monitoring HOTs, such as the simplest versions of the 
cold control theory, cannot account for these data as it seems that the suggestion allowed 
highly suggestible people to more efficiently resolve conflict than it was possible for them 
through non-hypnotic means. Thus, retaining the assumption of cold control that hypnotic vs 
non-hypnotical action differ primarily in accurate HOTs of intending, it seems HOTs of 
intention, at least the intention to create the experience of meaninglessness, can disrupt task 
performance; thus, HOTs can have causal effects on first-order states (cf. Rosenthal, 2008). 
Incidentally, this finding depicts a counterexample for the concept that conscious cognitive 
control processes are superior to unconscious ones (Cleeremans, 2006), given the assumption 
that the hypnotic and volitional processes differ in the conscious status of the intentions. 
A plausible candidate that can influence the two types of control to produce different 
results is the expectation about their efficiency, which is a well-known predictor of behaviors 
elicited by suggestions (Kirsch, 1985; Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). Our scale measuring the 
participants` expectations emphasised the experience of `word meaninglessness` and the 
results derived from these data indicate that expectancy was the same in the volitional and the 
suggestion condition, implying that expectancies of meaninglessness alone cannot account 
for the difference in the effectiveness in producing the word blindness effect in the two 
conditions. However, the underlying mechanism of the word blindness suggestion may not be 
related or restricted to visual processing, which would call into question the relevance of the 
scale we used in gauging expectations. Recent behavioral and neural studies of the word 
blindness suggestion provide evidence for the notion that the suggestion affects cognitive 
control processes rather than the visual input stream, thus, the successfulness of the 
suggestion might lie in the enhanced conflict resolution and not in the dampened perception 
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of the meaning of the words (Casiglia et al., 2010; Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris et 
al., 2013; Zahedi, Stuermer, Hatami, Rostami & Sommer, 2017). In line with this view, the 
suggestion, in our experiment, seemed to influence the performance mostly on the 
incongruent trials by reducing it compared to the no suggestion and volition conditions. 
Therefore, a measure of the expectations should aim to assess the beliefs of people about the 
efficiency of voluntary and involuntary control and not solely focus on the experience of 
meaningfulness. Incidentally, this new design will also allow us to critically evaluate the 
simplest form of the response expectancy theory (Kirsch, 1985), which claims that 
expectations are the single driving factors of hypnotic responses. Were the extent of 
interference different in volition and suggestion conditions while the expectations to see the 
words as meaningless characters, and to exert control be comparable in the two conditions, 
the response expectancy theory will need to be revised.  
Cold control theory asserts that to create the experience of meaninglessness the 
subjects need to have a first-order intention to produce it by engaging in an active strategy. 
The exact mechanism of this strategy is a mystery currently, but several empirical studies 
have been conducted on this issue that can help us exclude possible explanations. For 
instance, as mentioned above, it has been demonstrated that neither the dampening of the 
visual input (Raz et al., 2003), nor the inhibition of meaning processing can be responsible 
for the whole word blindness effect (Augustinova & Ferrand, 2012; Parris et al., 2013; 
Zahedi, et al., 2017). These findings are in consonance with the fact that a posthypnotic 
suggestion that specifically requires highs to lose the ability of reading did not result in the 
reduction of the Stroop interference effect; it appears that the suggestion needs to include a 
phrase such as “words are meaningless gibberish” to be successful in enhancing performance 
(MacLeod, 2011). Consequently, the meaning of the words must be processed to some extent 
even in the suggestion condition indicating that the information that the scripts of the stimuli 
are in fact meaningful is available to the participants. This strikes a chord with the idea that 
highs need to hold two models of reality in the suggestion condition as they do in the volition 
one.  In one model, the meaning can be extracted from the words, as they are meaningful, 
whereas in the other counterfactual model, this is not possible. Entertaining multiple models 
is the basis of pretence and imagination (Perner, 1991); not being aware that one intended to 
engage in pretence or imagination would, according to cold control theory, lead to the 
experience of hallucination or delusion.  
Pre-registered Experiment  
In this experiment, we intend to replicate the pilot experiment as a multi-lab pre-
registered replication project to increase the evidential value (by virtue of a larger sample) of 
our data. Moreover, we introduce a new item measuring the participants` expectations to how 
easily they can overcome the interference in each condition. With this, we aim to address 
more thoroughly whether involuntary control can be more efficient than the voluntary 
counterpart beyond the influence of expectations. In addition, we will measure the depth of 
hypnosis during induction and after de-induction to provide the participants a baseline against 
which they may compare their experienced depth of hypnosis during the Stroop task. 
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The questions that will be addressed are those of the pilot study: (a) Outcome neutral 
test: Was there a Stroop effect and did the suggestion work?; (b) Outcome neutral test: Did 
suggestion and volition conditions differ in experienced degree of control?; (c) Crucial test: Is 
the suggestion equally effective for suggestion and volition conditions in reducing Stroop 
interference as measured in RTs (taking into account expectations)?; (d) Supporting test of 
interest: Do suggestions and volitional requests produce the same subjective response?; (e) 
Side interest: Do post-hypnotic suggestions produce a hypnotic trance at the time of 
activating the suggestion? Is the depth of hypnosis different for the suggestion and volition 
conditions? In addition, we will explore whether the post-hypnotic suggestion produces a 
subjective experience of being in hypnosis while it is activated: Traditionally it is assumed 
that a post-hypnotic suggestion, by virtue of being post-hypnotic, does not involve the 
experience of being in a hypnotic state at the time of responding (Terhune, Luke & Cohen 
Kadosh, 2017).  Furthermore, we will estimate the extent to which self-reported measures of 
the feeling of voluntariness converge to assess their validity. Finally, we will run an 
exploratory correlation analysis to estimate the extent to which the participants are engaging 
in the same cognitive strategy in the volition and suggestion conditions. The results of this 
analysis can be used to estimate the sample size of a future study that aims to reach a good 
enough evidence supporting the idea that the underlying mechanisms of the responses are 
either the same or different in the two conditions.10 
Methods 
Participants.  Labs from the following institutions will recruit participants 
throughout the academic year of 2018-19: University of Sussex, School of Psychology (US) 
University of Bournemouth, Department of Psychology (UB) Lancaster University 
Department of Psychology (LaU); Lund University, Department of Psychology (LuU). We 
will invite highly suggestible students who are proficient readers of English11 to attend the 
experiment in exchange for course credits or payment. The amount of payment and course 
credits will be in line with the regulations of the local universities (£6 at US, £8 at UB, £7 at 
LaU and vouchers for movie tickets that worth about 110 SEK at LuU). The suggestibility of 
the students will be gauged by the Sussex Waterloo Susceptibility to Hypnosis scale 
(SWASH; Lush, Moga, McLatchie & Dienes, 2018) prior to participation and the threshold 
of highly suggestibility will be based on the composite SWASH score (top 15% of the 
population) of the first year psychology students at Sussex (year 2018)(matching typical 
percentages used to define “high” in the literature; Barnier & McConkey, 2004; Anlló, 
Becchio & Sackur, 2017). To reduce the cost of screening at UB, LaU and LuU, where 
possible we will invite participants to undertake the SWASH who were previously identified 
as highs with other measures. The participants will be asked to read an information sheet 
about the study and consent to the terms of participation before starting the experiment. The 
local Ethical Committees have approved the study. 
                                                 
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
11
 Apart from the Stroop stimuli, the English materials will be used at Lund University and it will be highlighted 
in the recruitment letter that fluency in English is an inclusion criterion of the study. During the Stroop task in 
the Swedish sample, we will use the color words RÖD [RED], BLÅ [BLUE], GRÖN [GREEN] and GUL 




Since we will rely solely on Bayes factors to draw statistical inference, we can use 
optional stopping (Rouder, 2014). The minimum sample size is set at 20 and then we will 
conduct all of the crucial analyses after roughly every subject (as different labs are involved 
there may be some clumping). We will stop collecting the data when all outcome neutral tests 
provide at least moderate evidence supporting that they have been successful, or else have 
failed, and when the main test of the study, comparing volition and suggestion conditions, 
also become sensitive (i.e. the B either larger than 3 or smaller than 1/3). A sample size 
estimation based on the data of the pilot study suggests that we will need around 40 
participants to show supporting evidence for the null, if the difference between the samples is 
0 ms and if the standard deviation of the crucial measure will be the same in this study as 
observed in the pilot study (See Supplementary Materials for details of the analysis). Should 
any of the four analyses remain insensitive with 60 participants, we will desist from 
recruiting more participants. We will immediately begin to recruit participants after the date 
of in-principle acceptance (either the spring term of 2018 or autumn term of 2018) and stop if 
all of the specified analyses reach sensitivity, if we have 60 participants or if the spring term 
of 2019 finishes (end of May). 
Stimuli and apparatus.  The materials of the registered experiment will be identical 
to those used in the pilot. We will employ OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) 
to compile and run the Stroop task part of our experiment. The resolution of the applied 
computer screens will be either 1280x1024 or adjusted to these values so that the size of the 
presented stimuli will be constant across labs. 
Design and procedure.  The design of the registered experiment will be in 
accordance with those of the pilot experiment. To ensure that none of our participants 
possesses color vision deficiency, we will include a statement in the recruitment letter that 
only people with intact color vision can attend the study. In addition, we will make three 
modifications in the instruction of the volition condition. Namely, we will put the sentence 
“You have the ability to do that anytime you please, under your control, as effectively as you 
just did.” before the following two sentences “You have the ability to do that anytime you 
please, under your control, as effectively as you just did. You'll notice we have not initiated a 
suggestion by clapping or giving any other cue.”, in order to avoid the implication that the 
participants have the ability to activate the suggestion without the clap even in the volition 
condition. Moreover, we will replace the “as effectively as you just did” part with “as 
effectively as you did it during the hypnotic induction” to make it clear that we refer to the 
word blindness test that was done during the induction procedure. In addition, we will add an 
extra sentence highlighting that the effect of a suggestion can be achieved through voluntary 
means. See Appendix C for the final instruction of the volition condition. 
In addition, we will introduce four amendments in the self-report measures: (a) we 
will include a new item at the beginning of each Stroop condition measuring the expectations 
about the efficiency to control the interfering information; (b) we will replace the 
dichotomous answer option of the question measuring the experienced nature of 
meaninglessness by a continuous scale; (c) we will omit the question concerning the recall of 
the words; (d) we will replace the item measuring the depth of hypnosis to the one which is 
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used in the SWASH (2017). See Appendix D for the new items. Moreover, we will measure 
the depth of hypnosis during the induction procedure, right before the delivery of the 
suggestion, and we will also measure it after the de-induction. 
Data analysis 
The steps of the data analysis will closely follow those of the pilot experiment, including the 
exclusion criterion regarding RT data and how we draw conclusions based on the results of 
the Bayes factors (e.g., outcome neutral tests and the crucial test).  
In terms of Bayes factor calculation, we will retain the parameters of the H1 models 
of the analyses with RTs. However, to increase the sensitivity of our tests with the self-report 
measures in comparing the suggestion and volition conditions, we will be informed by the 
results of the pilot experiment. Specifically, given the score of pilot subjects in the volition 
condition we can determine the maximum predicted change allowed with respect to the 
suggestion condition. For example on a 0-3 scale of experienced control (0 = no control, 3 = 
complete control), the volition condition in the pilot study scored 2.0, so the suggestion 
condition  could experience up to 2 rating units of less control (as it is expected to be smaller 
than the mean of the volition condition). The maximum difference between conditions is thus 
estimated as about 2 for the new experiment, and the SD of the half normal can be set as 
max/2  = 1 rating unit (Dienes, 2014). For expectations (both questions), the SD was set at 
1.4 by this process, and the SD for four items assessing subjective experiences as 
meaningless was set at 30. 
 We will have three outcome neutral tests to ensure that our experiment is able to test 
the proposed question. All of these tests have to provide evidence favouring the alternative 
hypotheses to allow us to carry on with the main analyses. We will test the presence of the 
Stroop interference effect while ignoring the influence of the type of the control. We will test 
that the experienced degrees of control is higher in the volition than the suggestion 
conditions. Finally, we will assess whether the suggestion reproduced the word blindness 
effect by reducing the extent of Stroop interference in the suggestion condition compared to 
the no suggestion condition.   
 The crucial test of the experiment will be the comparison of the suggestion and 
volition conditions in terms of the extent of Stroop interference. Thus, we will base our final 
conclusion on this statistical test. In addition, we will run a further analysis to control for the 
effect of expectations, conditional on the test of difference in expectations between the 
volition and suggestion conditions. If the evidence does not reach ⅓ to support the claim that 
the beliefs about the efficiency of suggestion and volition are identical, we will conduct a 
secondary test. We will use a regression model with the difference in the interference score 
between conditions (suggestion vs. volition) as the dependent variable and the difference for 
expectations (suggestion vs. volition) as independent variables (if none of the expectation 
measures provide evidence for the null then the outlined analysis will be done as a multiple 
regression with both of the measures as predictors in the model). To conduct the crucial 
analysis while partialling out the effect of expectations, we will test the intercept of the 
regression line against zero. By this, we can examine the difference between the suggestion 
21 
 
and volition effects while controlling for the effect of expectations. The parameters of this 
Bayes factor analysis will be the same as the one testing the main question of the study. 
 The following are not the main point of the experiment and are thus of secondary 
interest. We will test whether post-hypnotic suggestion and volitional request produce the 
same subjective responses in exactly the same way as was done in the pilot.   We will 
estimate hypnotic depth for no suggestion, suggestion and volition conditions, and for the 
hypnotic induction and the moment of de-induction with 95% CIs assuming a uniform prior 
over the scale range. To explore whether these conditions and time points differ in hypnotic 
depth, we will calculate the Bayes factor for the following comparisons: difference between 
induction and de-induction, induction and suggestion, de-induction and suggestion, 
suggestion and volition conditions. We will model H1 with a half-normal, and SD of 0.86 
rating unit based on the difference between suggestion and volition conditions in the pilot (we 
will use the difference between the volition and suggestion condition means after adjusting it 
according to the lengths of the new and old scales). 
 To estimate the convergent validity of the self-report measures of involuntariness, we 
will calculate the correlation and 95% CIs of the “level of control” and “experienced nature 
of meaninglessness” items on the difference scores of the volition and suggestion conditions. 
We can assess whether people changed the conscious status of the intention to imagine by the 
difference between volition and suggestion conditions in the experienced nature of 
meaninglessness item (i.e. experienced as imagination vs perception). As “imagination” is not 
mentioned in the volition instructions (unlike in the pilot), this tests whether subjects report a 
change that was not directly instructed, but should still occur according to cold control 
theory. As this item has a 4-point scale as the degree of control scale does, we will test with 
the same model of H1 (i.e. SD = 1 unit). We will calculate the correlation and 95% CI 
between the extent to which subjects can reduce the interference in the suggestion and 






The data and the analysis script of the pilot experiment can be retrieved from osf.io/d67u8. 
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Appendix A. Protocol of the Pilot Experiment 
This is an example protocol in which the order of the condition was: (1) Suggestion, (2) No 
suggestion, (3) Volition. Note that the order of these conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
1.      Instructions and consent form 
Start script and provide the participant with the consent form 
2.      Practice 
5 minutes of practice Stroop. Ends up with a screen asking to wait for the experimenter. 
3.      Induction, suggestion and test of suggestion 
(O). Induction by Eye Closure. 
(1). Now, please seat yourself comfortably and rest your hands in your lap.  That's 
right.  Rest your hands in your lap.  Now look at your hands and find a spot on either hand 
and just focus on it.  It doesn't matter what spot you choose; just select some spot to focus on.  
I will refer to the spot you have chosen as the target.  That's right... hands relaxed... look 
directly at the target. 
I am about to help you to relax, and meanwhile I will give you some instructions that 
will help you to gradually enter a state of hypnosis.  Please look steadily at the target and 
while staring at it, keep listening to my words.  You can become hypnotized if you are 
willing to do what I tell you to, and if you concentrate on the target and on what I say.  You 
have already shown your willingness by coming here today, and so I am assuming that your 
presence here means that you want to experience all that you can.  Just do your best to 
concentrate on the target -- pay close attention to my words, and let happen whatever you feel 
is going to take place.  Just let yourself go.  Pay close attention to what I tell you to think 
about; if your mind wanders, that will be okay; just bring your thoughts back to the target and 
my words, and you can easily experience more of what it's like to be hypnotized. 
Hypnosis is perfectly normal and natural, and follows from the conditions of attention 
and suggestion we are using together.  It is chiefly a matter of focusing sharply on some 
particular thing.  Sometimes you experience something very much like hypnosis when 
driving along a straight highway and you are oblivious to the landmarks along the road.  The 
relaxation in hypnosis is very much like the first stages of falling asleep, but you will not 
really be asleep in the ordinary sense, because you will continue to hear my voice and will be 
able to direct your thoughts to the topics that I suggest.  What is important here today is your 
willingness to go along with the ideas I suggest and to let happen whatever is about to 
happen.  Nothing will be done to embarrass you. 
(2)  Now take it easy and just let yourself relax.  Keep looking at the target as steadily 
as you can, thinking only of it and my words.  If your eyes drift away, don't let that bother 
you... just focus again on the target.  Pay attention to how the target changes, how the 
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shadows play around it, how it is sometimes fuzzy, sometimes clear.  Whatever you see is all 
right.  Just let yourself experience whatever happens and keep staring at the target a little 
longer.  After awhile, however, you will have stared long enough, and your eyes will feel 
very tired, and you will wish strongly that they were closed.  Then they will close, as if by 
themselves.  When this happens, just let it happen. 
(3)  As I continue to talk, you will find that you will become more and more drowsy.  
When the time comes that your eyes have closed, just let them remain closed.  
You will find that you can relax completely, but at the same time sit up comfortably in 
your chair with little effort.  You will be able to shift your position to make yourself 
comfortable as needed without it disturbing you.  For now, just relax more and more.  As you 
think of relaxing, your muscles will actually begin to relax.  Starting with your right foot, 
relax the muscles of your right leg......  Now the muscles of your left leg......  Just relax all 
over.  Relax your right hand...  your forearm...  upper arm...  and shoulder....  That's right....  
Now your left hand....  and forearm....  and upper arm....  and shoulder....  Relax your neck, 
and chest....  more and more relaxed....  completely relaxed....  completely relaxed. 
 (4)  As you become relaxed, your body will feel deeply at ease....  comfortably heavy.  
You will begin to have this pleasant feeling of heaviness and comfort in your legs and feet....  
in your hands and arms....  throughout your body....  as though you were settling deep into the 
chair.  Your body feels comfortable and heavy....  Your eyelids feel heavy too, heavy and 
tired.  You are beginning to feel very relaxed and comfortable.  You are breathing freely and 
deeply, freely and deeply.  You are becoming more and more deeply and comfortably 
relaxed.  Your eyelids are becoming heavier, more and more heavy and difficult to keep 
open. 
 (5)  Staring at the target so long has made your eyes very tired.  Your eyes may hurt 
from staring and your eyelids feel very heavy.  Soon you will no longer be able to keep your 
eyes open.  Soon you will have stood the discomfort long enough; your eyes are tired from 
staring, and your eyelids will feel too tired to remain open.  Perhaps your eyes are becoming 
moist from the strain.  You are becoming more and more relaxed and comfortable.  The strain 
in your eyes is getting greater and greater.  It would be a relief just to let your eyes close and 
to relax completely, relax completely.  The strain in your eyes will eventually be so great that 
you will welcome your eyes closing of themselves, of themselves. 
 (6)  Your eyes are tired and your eyelids feel very heavy.  Your whole body feels 
heavy and relaxed.  You feel a pleasant warm tingling throughout your body as you become 
more and more deeply relaxed  ...  deeper  ...  deeper  ...  more relaxed  ...  completely relaxed 
and drifting down into a warm pleasant state of relaxation.  Keep your thoughts on what I am 
saying; listen to my voice.  Your eyes are getting blurred from straining.  You can hardly see 
the target, your eyes are so strained.  The strain is getting greater, greater and greater, greater 
and greater.  Your eyelids are heavy.  Very heavy.  Getting heavier and heavier, heavier and 
heavier.  They are pushing down, down, down.  Your eyelids seem weighted and heavy, 
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pulled down by the weight  ....  so heavy  ...  your eyes are blinking, blinking  ....  closing, 
closing  ... 
Your eyes may have closed by now, and if they have not, they would soon close of 
themselves.  But there is no need to strain them more.  You have concentrated well on the 
target, and have become very relaxed.  Now we have come to the time when you may just let 
your eyes close.  That's it, eyes closed now. 
 (7)  You now feel very relaxed, but you are going to become even more relaxed.  It is 
easier to relax completely now that your eyes are closed.  You will keep them closed until I 
tell you to open them or until I tell you to become alert  ...  You feel pleasantly, deeply 
relaxed and very comfortable as you continue to hear my voice.  Just let your thoughts dwell 
on what I'm saying.  You are going to become even more relaxed and comfortable. Soon you 
will be deeply hypnotized, but you will have no trouble hearing me. You will remain deeply 
hypnotized until I tell you to awaken later on.  Soon I shall begin to count from one to 
twenty. As I count, you will feel yourself going down further and further into a deeply 
relaxed, a deeply hypnotized state...  but you will be able to do all sorts of things I ask you to 
do without waking up...  One...  you are going to become more deeply relaxed and 
hypnotized.... Two... down, down deeper, and deeper...  Three...  Four... more and more 
deeply hypnotized....  Five... Six...  Seven...  you are sinking deeper and deeper into hypnosis.  
Nothing will disturb you...  Just let your thoughts focus on my voice and those things I tell 
you to think of.  You are finding it easy just to listen to the things I tell you.  Eight...  Nine, 
Ten...  halfway there...  always deeper... Eleven... Twelve... Thirteen... Fourteen... Fifteen...  
although deeply hypnotized you can hear me clearly. You will always hear me distinctly no 
matter how deeply hypnotized you become. Sixteen... Seventeen... Eighteen...  deeply 
hypnotized.  Nothing will disturb you.  You are going to experience many things that I will 
tell you to experience... Nineteen... Twenty.  Deeply hypnotized now!  You will not wake up 
until I tell you to.  You will wish to remain relaxed and hypnotized and to have the 
experiences I describe to you. 
Even though you are deeply relaxed and hypnotized, I want you to realize that you 
will be able to write, to move, and even to open your eyes if I ask you to do so, and still 
remain just as hypnotized and comfortable as you are now.  It will not disturb you at all to 
open your eyes, move about, and write things.  You will remain hypnotized until I tell you 
otherwise...  All right, then.... 
Very soon you will be playing a computer game. When I clap my hands once, meaningless 
symbols will appear in the middle of the screen. They will feel like characters of a foreign 
language that you do not know, and you will not attempt to attribute any meaning to them. 
This gibberish will be printed in one of four ink colours: red, blue, green or yellow. Although 
you will only be able to attend to the symbols ink colour, you will look straight at the 
scrambled signs and crisply see all of them. Your job is to quickly and accurately depress the 
key that corresponds to the ink colour shown. You will find that you can play this game easily 
and effortlessly. When I clap my hands twice, you will regain your normal reading abilities.  
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[Clap to activate: “Now you see meaningless words on the screen] 
[Show an example word and ask the participant to open her eyes and read out loud the 
following question with the answer options] 
How strongly do you experience the word as meaningless? 
1)   The meaning of the word on the screen is completely clear to me 
2)   The meaning of the word on the screen is a little unclear 
3)   The meaning of the word on the screen is unclear 
4)   The meaning of the word on the screen is completely unclear 
[If the participant has chosen 1 or 2 then read the following script otherwise jump it through] 
“Notice how as you look at the word on the screen, you can look at it with the meaning 
fading to the background of your mind. We have found even when people consciously 
experience some meaning after this suggestion, they still process the words differently at a 
deeper level. You know you are capable of not reading meaningfully, remember how you 
have zoned out while reading a book.” 
[Clap twice to deactivate: “Now you see meaningful words on the screen”] 
[Ask the participant to close her eyes] 
Stay completely relaxed and pay close attention to what I'm going to tell you next.  In 
a moment I shall begin counting backwards from twenty to one. You will awaken gradually, 
but for most of the count you will remain in the pleasant, relaxed state that you are now in. 
By the time I reach "five" you will open your eyes, but you will not be fully aroused. When I 
get to "one", you will be fully alert, in your normal state of wakefulness. You probably will 
have the impression that you have slept, because you will have difficulty in remembering all 
the things I have told you and all the things you did or felt, since you started looking at the 
target. In fact, you will find it so much of an effort to recall any of these things that you will 
have no wish to do so.  It will be much easier simply to forget everything until I tell you that 
you can remember.  You will remember nothing of what you did or felt from the time that 
you started looking at the target, until I say to you: "Now you can remember everything!" 
You will not remember anything you did until then. After you open your eyes you will feel 
fine. I shall now count backwards from twenty, and at "five", not sooner, you will open your 
eyes but not be fully aroused until I say "one". At "one" you will be awake ... Ready, now: 
20...19...18... 17... 16... 15... 14... 13... 12... 11... 10, halfway... 9... 8... 7... 6... five... 4... 3... 
2... 1. Wake up! Wide awake! Any remaining drowsiness which you may feel will quickly 
pass. 
From now you won’t feel hypnotised at all, but the suggestion will powerfully affect 
you when it is activated by the clap." 
4.      Suggestion condition  
[Say the following] 
[Clap to activate suggestion: “Now you see meaningless words on the screen”] 
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 [Get the expectancy rating. Read out loud the question and provide the participant with the 
text format. Explain in detail if the participant has a question (same procedure for all of the 
other self-report measures)] 
[Start the Stroop task] 
[Ask about the subjective experience] 
[Ask them to recall the meaning of the words] 
[Ask about the depth of hypnosis] 
[Ask about the level of control] 
[Ask about how did they produce the effect of meaninglessness] 
[Clap twice to deactivate suggestion: “Now you see meaningful words on the screen”] 
5.      No suggestion condition  
[Say the following] 
“For this part of the experiment no suggestion has been activated. It is important that you 
make no attempt to make the words seem like gibberish or word of foreign language. We 
would now like you to respond to the colour of the word on the screen as quickly and as 
accurately as you can” 
[Get the expectancy rating] 
[Start the Stroop task] 
[Ask about the subjective experience] 
[Ask them to recall the meaning of the words] 
[Ask about the depth of hypnosis] 
[Ask about the level of control] 
6. Volition condition 
[Say the following] 
“Highly hypnotisable individuals such as you have been shown to be able to eliminate the 
interference from the irrelevant word when under the influence of the post-hypnotic 
suggestion and even when the suggestion is given without hypnosis.  We would like you to 
voluntarily strongly and clearly imagine the irrelevant words as gibberish, words of a foreign 
language so that no meaning can be taken from them.  This is not a hypnotic suggestion and 
we have not hypnotised you for this part of the task. You'll notice we have not initiated a 
suggestion by clapping or giving any other cue. You have the ability to do that anytime you 
please, under your control, as effectively as you just did. Please now voluntarily remove 
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meaning from the words. You can do this so that it is under your control, just by exercising 
your imagination. You can be aware it is your imagination at the same time as it produces 
powerful effects.” 
[Have the participants look at a Stroop stimulus on the screen and ask them to make the word 
seem meaningless and then meaningful again. Tell them they can turn the control on and off.] 
[Get the expectancy rating.] 
[Start the Stroop task] 
[Ask about the subjective experience] 
[Ask them to recall the meaning of the words] 
[Ask about the depth of hypnosis] 
[Ask about the level of control] 
[Ask about how did they produce the effect of meaninglessness] 
[Finish] 






Appendix B. Items of the Pilot Experiment 
Expectations 
How strongly do you expect to experience the words as at least somewhat meaningless? 
1. I know the meaning of the words on the screen will be completely clear to me 
2. I have a little confidence that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some 
way be unclear 
3. I am somewhat sure that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
4. I am fairly sure that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
5. I am almost certain that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be 
unclear 
6. I am certain that the meaning of the words on the screen will in some way be unclear 
Subjective experience questions 
On what percentage of the trials: 
1. Was the meaning of the words on the screen completely clear to you? 
2. Were you aware of only an unclear meaning of the words on the screen? 
3. Were you just aware of the colour and had  no idea of what script the words were 
written in? 
4. Were the words on the screen written in a clear yet completely meaningless script? 
Recalling the meaning of the words 
If you were aware of any words, can you recall them? 
Depth of hypnosis scale 
How deeply hypnotised were you during that game (Stroop task)? 
1. Normal state 
2. Relaxed 
3. Hypnotized 
4. Deeply hypnotized 
Level of control 
How much control did you have over how meaningful the words appeared to you? 
1. I had no control 
2. I had some control 
3. I had almost complete control 
4. I had complete control 
Experienced nature of meaninglessness 
How did you produce the effect of meaninglessness? 
1. The script appearing meaningless was just me imagining it was meaningless 
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Appendix C. Instruction in the Volition condition of the Pre-registered Experiment 
“Highly hypnotisable individuals such as you have been shown to be able to eliminate 
the interference from the irrelevant word when under the influence of the post-hypnotic 
suggestion and even when the suggestion is given without hypnosis. Notice that when a 
hypnotic suggestion is given it is always you who creates the response; thus you can achieve 
the full effect of a suggestion any time you wish. We would like you to voluntarily, strongly 
and clearly create the experience that the irrelevant words are gibberish, words of a foreign 
language so that no meaning can be taken from them. You have the ability to do that anytime 
you please, under your control, as effectively as you did it during the hypnotic induction. This 
is not a hypnotic suggestion and we have not hypnotised you for this part of the task. You'll 
notice we have not initiated a suggestion by clapping or giving any other cue. Please now 
voluntarily remove meaning from the words. You can do this so that it is under your control, 
just by exercising your every-day capacity to consider the world in different ways, while still 
knowing how the world really is. You can have complete control over the strategy you used 





Appendix D. New items of the Pre-registered Experiment 
Expectations 2. 
How strongly do you expect that naming the colour of the words will be somewhat easy? 
1. I know that naming the colour of the words on the screen will be hard to me  
2. I have a little confidence that naming the colour of the words on the screen will in 
some way be easy 
3. I am somewhat sure that naming the colour of the words on the screen will in some 
way be easy 
4. I am fairly sure that naming the colour of the words on the screen will in some way be 
easy 
5. I am almost certain that naming of the words on the screen will in some way be easy 
6. I am certain that naming of the words on the screen will in some way be easy 
Depth of hypnosis 
On a scale from 0 to 5, to what degree did you enter a hypnotic state during the game? 0 
means your general state of consciousness was just the same as normal, 1 means you were 
slightly hypnotized and 5 means you entered very deep hypnosis? 
Normal State 0 – 1  –  2  –  3  –  4  –  5 Deep hypnosis 
Experienced nature of meaninglessness 
How did it seem the effect of meaninglessness came about? 
The script appearing meaningless 
was me perceiving it as 
meaningless 
1 – 2  –  3  –  4   The script appearing meaningless 
was me imagining it as meaningless 
 
